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Overview
The Republic of Korea (South Korea) was one of the first countries in the world
to be heavily affected by COVID-19. By early March 2020, it became the second
most infected country after China. According to the data of Korea Disease Control
and Prevention Agency (KCDA) – formerly Korea Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (KCDC) –, the first peak of the outbreak, which was mainly related to a
religious group, was on 29 February 2020, reporting 909 infected in a single day.
But after overcoming the initial peak, South Korea has been able to maintain
new cases at around 10 cases per day in the third week of April, whereas
many countries have reached ever higher number of infections. Afterwards
“the second wave” has come since mid-August (the peak was on 27 August: 441
daily cases) and “the third” since mid-November (the peak was on 25 December:
1241 daily cases). But these two have been also gradually calmed down (as of early
March 2021).
South Korea has reduced the significant number of new confirmed COVID-19
cases without ordering stringent restrictions, nor locking down regions and causing
severe economic damage. South Korea was able to slow down the spread
of COVID-19 along with the government’s quick reaction to the disease. The
government has been implementing nationwide free public testing programs. The
KCDC in the government tracked all the confirmed cases’ geographic footprints
and publicized the information to the people via online websites and mobile texts.
Local cities opened up an innovative ‘drive-through’ testing area, which became
a model followed by other countries. The civil society has also generally followed
the guidelines provided by government, including using medical face masks and
adapting to ‘social-distancing.’ Though authorities remain highly alert amid new
clusters of infections, and gradually and inevitably several social and economic
problems have also arisen in South Korea due to the ‘social distancing’ measures
sustained for a long period, the virus curve appears to be relatively flattening again
even after “the third wave”.
Emergency Law? – Not Used So Far
According to Art. 76 of the Constitution, there are two types of measures that
the President can urgently issue in case of emergency: an “emergency financial
order” (Art. 76 (1)) and an “emergency order” (Art. 76 (2)) – if we exclude the
possibility of the martial law clause (Art. 77) which grants direct military control of
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normal civil functions or suspension of civil law and can rekindle the trauma of the
authoritarian past.
The executive office and official residence of the President of South Korea (The
Blue House) announced already on 3 March 2020 that it was “not considering” the
opposition’s call for an emergency order to secure patients’ beds for new coronavirus
infections. The government added that the current situation did not meet the
requirements of the Korean Constitution to issue an emergency order. For example,
Article 76 (1) has the requirement of “[…] only when […] there is no time to await the
convocation of the National Assembly” and even then there was no problem with the
convocation of the National Assembly.
The Blue House has maintained the position that emergency law is currently not
necessary. This is because the heads of local governments can designate all
medical institutions as infectious disease management institutions to utilize the beds
and use private facilities as a first aid measure, according to the Infectious Disease
Control and Prevention Act (hereinafter the IDCPA; the most updated version
(amended on 9 March 2021, as Act No. 17920) is in Korean, and a recent version
of the Act, amended on 4 March 2020 (Act No. 17067), is available in English).
However, the political debate on this does not seem to be completely over even
in 2021. On 26 January 2021, the leader of the main opposition party renewed a
proposal. The proposal was that the President should issue an emergency financial
order [Art. 76 (1)] to set aside a 100 trillion won (around $89.1 billion) budget to deal
with the coronavirus aftereffects including financial bailouts and compensation for
losses, whereas the ruling party plans to use the ordinary legislative process for such
measures.
The Effectiveness of Legislative Scrutiny and
Judicial Oversight
After the mistakes made during the initial response to the 2015 MERS outbreak,
the South Korean legislature (the National Assembly) revised relevant provisions
of the IDCPA, which essentially prepared Korea against the devastating effects
of COVID-19. The revision extended the administrative measures in response
to epidemic situations, which include authorizing the Minister of Health to collect
personal data to ’track’ the travel history of confirmed patients without a court order
during infectious disease emergency situations (Article 76-2(2)), and disclose these
information to the public (Article 34-2 (1)). These revisions served as the legal basis
for the various administrative countermeasures the Korean government implemented
to protect the public against COVID-19. The bitter experience during MERS actually
prepared the Korean government to effectively fight against infectious diseases.
However, South Korea’s ‘track’ and ‘disclose’ strategies raise concerns about privacy
and surveillance. Fortunately, these problems have now been partially resolved
through the revisions of laws and guidelines. For example, on 29 September 2020,
an additional limitation was inserted to Paragraph 1 of Article 34-2 of the IDCPA,
which states that “personal information determined to be irrelevant to the prevention
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of infectious diseases by Presidential Decree, such as sex, age, and so on, shall
be excluded.” (As of 31 March 2021, this provision is not translated yet and only
available in Korean.)
Some have also raised issues with Article 76-2 of the IDCPA, which allows the
Director of KCDC or local government to requests a wide array of information from
various governmental and non-governmental institutions. Such provision may allow
possible infringements of human rights, thereby rendering the protection of personal
information ineffective. A petition questioning the constitutionality of Article 76-2 was
filed to the Constitutional Court, and it is currently under review.
The ban on gathering based on Article 49 of the IDCPA, is one of the most frequently
used administrative public health measures by the Korean government. Limiting the
number of people allowed to join for private gatherings or restricting gatherings at
certain locations all intend to slow the spread of the virus. However, these measures
may infringe upon certain constitutional rights, as these gathering restrictions are
also applied to protests, religious events, and gatherings at specific businesses, like
cafes, weddings, and nightclubs.
Nevertheless, seemingly invasive measures were initially happily condoned by
the public, which was evident by the extremely small number of lawsuits filed
by citizens against the government in South Korea in the early stages of the
pandemic. In fact, the government actually lodged several damage suits against
religious organizations and individuals who violated quarantine laws. However, as
the COVID-19 situation prolonged, new restrictions on constitutional rights were
introduced by the government, and public’s fatigue increased. As a result, there has
been a rise in legal disputes between individuals and the government during the
recent months. One prominent example is the damage suit filed by infected inmates
at the district jail against the government for its failure to prevent and address the
spread of the virus within the detention facility.
There have been many requests for suspension regarding the ban on gatherings, but
the courts have struggled to adjudicate. These cases request for a speedy trial which
leaves insufficient time for a fair review, and the review is carried out with a limited
amount of epidemiologic information. Furthermore, the court lacks uniform standards
based on scientific knowledge. While most courts upheld local governments’ orders
to ban large gatherings in light of public safety concerns, some courts did allow some
of the rallies to take place, despite the increased coronavirus risk, citing civil liberties
of the protesters. In fact, on 14 August 2020, Administrative Chamber 11 of Seoul
Administrative Court issued an injunction that prevented the banning of a large-scale
demonstrations in the heart of Seoul in mid-August. However, this demonstration
ignited a surge of confirmed patients in Korea, which illustrates the difficult position
of the courts.
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COVID-19 Management Framework of South Korean
Governance
In South Korea, a unitary country, the ‘Korea Disease Control and Prevention
Agency’ (KDCA) is an independent administrative agency within the central
government, which functions as a control tower for the prevention of epidemics.
It was originally affiliated with the Ministry of Health and Welfare, under the name
of the ‘Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’ (KCDC). Soon after the
breakout of COVID-19, the affiliated center was promoted to an independent agency.
The Central Disaster Management Headquarters (CDMH) within the Central
Disaster and Safety Countermeasure Headquarter (CDSCH), headed by the Prime
Minister of the central government, is responsible for supporting the Central Disease
Control Headquarters (CDCH). Local governments are responsible for infection
monitoring, epidemiological investigation, and community management. Metropolitan
and provincial governments are in charge of managing a larger community area,
along with providing intensive-care rooms for infected patients. Furthermore, basic
local governments are responsible for disclosing infection routes within their area,
conducting diagnosis, quarantine, and vaccination tasks centered in affiliated health
centers.
In South Korea, the current medical system centers around public and private
medical institutions and staff. Therefore, establishing a solid medical support
system through public-private cooperation is vital. So far, we can evaluate that such
cooperation in South Korea has played a critical role in preventing further outbreak
of COVID-19. Additionally, the availability of low-cost diagnostic tests made possible
through Korea’s strong ‘universal healthcare system’ played a key part in Korea’s
success.
Moreover, the voluntary and active participation in preventive measures by the public
should also be recognized for its role in Korea’s fight against the pandemic. One
of the reasons for such high public cooperation may be the social pressure derived
from Korea’s collectivist culture. But another important factor that deserves more
attention would be the citizens’ confidence in the effectiveness of social distancing,
which emphasizes the potency of quarantine and wearing a mask.
Considerations of Human Rights and Civil Liberties
During the early stages of the pandemic, South Korea was one of the few countries
that have been fighting the coronavirus without a physical lockdown or curfews.
Instead, Korea employed an “epidemiological approach,” where the government
spent its resources on gathering the travel history of confirmed patients, performing
diagnostic testing on anyone who came in contact with the infected, and providing
treatment. The government introduced three-tiered (later five-tier) ‘social distancing
guidelines’ in its three-tier (later five-tier) system where more restrictive measures
are implemented based on the daily number of newly confirmed cases. Accordingly,
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once the number of confirmed cases rapidly increased in December of 2020, the
government applied higher tier regulations based on the guidelines.
Most of all there has been controversy over whether the ban of gatherings is an
excessive restriction on the constitutional rights like freedom of assembly and
religion. Fines or punishment are imposed for these violations. In South Korea,
places of worship were one of the most high-risk areas for spreading the virus, and
it has been confirmed that the virus continues to spread through religious services.
This has led to some collective animosity towards religious institutions (especially
specific sects), which eventually challenged the freedom of religion.
A wide range of stores, restaurants, gyms and cafes were subjected to strict
measures of ‘social distancing,’ which prevented them from operating normally.
This measure was prolonged to the extent that it was practically impossible for the
business owners to sustain a living. Even though there have been no lockdowns
in South Korea, this kind of measures, such as ‘bans on private gatherings of 5 or
more people’ (based on the Article 49 of the IDCPA) caused severe deduction in
income for many. Many have raised concerns regarding the proportionality of these
administrative measures regarding constitutional rights. Especially certain types of
businesses, like entertainment centers and sports arenas where infections frequently
occurred, were completely prohibited from operating for a prolonged period of
time. They remained closed until the number of infected cases decreased to a
significantly lower number. The excessive restrictions on their economic freedom
and the discrimination against high-risk entertainment centers became another legal
issue. Currently, small businesses and merchants have filed a petition against the
social distancing measures without compensation to the Constitutional Court. When
there is no law, ‘compensation for loss’ due to the restriction of property rights due
to business suspension based on lawful administrative action is controversial. The
government plans to institutionalize specific compensation measures into law as
well as additional financial bailout laws to supplement the suspensions of high-risk
businesses.
The reinforced regulation even prohibits private gatherings of 5 or more people
among family members, acquaintances, and friends. The broad restriction can be
justified only as an urgent and temporary measure. Nevertheless, the restriction
has been in effect for months, due to statistical evidence that points to correlations
between the increase in private gatherings and mass infections. The regulation is
implemented through the cooperation of the public.
Also, infected patients are socially condemned for being infected, regardless of
their unpreventable circumstances. This leads to a concern of social discrimination
against the confirmed patients. The pandemic has ignited some discriminations
against homosexuals, due to an outbreak in a LGBTQ club. Quarantining the
disabled was another issue of importance. Therefore, the Korean National Human
Rights Commission was urged to monitor any unfair discrimination fueled by corona
phobia, and provide protection for the disabled people during the pandemic.
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Outlook
Along with intensive preventive measures against COVD-19, the number of active
infected cases has decreased for now. However, the long-term countermeasures
should also be established immediately, and meticulously. The following points
should be considered when preparing for the new phase of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Most importantly, legal measures need to be implemented to address the heavier
burden placed on the socially underprivileged citizens due to the pandemic. Some
examples may be institutionalizing family care, supporting individuals who struggle
with accelerated digitalization from prolonged epidemics, and strengthening support
for the unemployed, all accompanied by the expansion of basic social rights.
Furthermore, it is necessary to establish a detailed legal system regarding
the distribution and inoculation of vaccines. The concept of vaccination is
widely approved among South Koreans. Therefore, the legal system requires a
comprehensive and socially acceptable structure in establishing the vaccine priority
groups and selecting type of immunizations, handling vaccine skeptics, adjusting the
cost of vaccines and signing in compensation laws for vaccine related injury.
* The authors of this post would like to express their gratitude to Ji-Ye KIM and Prof.
Hye-Sun YOON for their proofreading and advice.
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